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Abstract
Some thirty years ago, two proposals were made concerning criteria for
identity of proofs. Prawitz proposed to analyze identity of proofs in terms
of the equivalence relation based on reduction to normal form in natural
deduction. Lambek worked on a normalization proposal analogous to
Prawitz’s, based on reduction to cut-free form in sequent systems, but he
also suggested understanding identity of proofs in terms of an equivalence
relation based on generality, two derivations having the same generality
if after generalizing maximally the rules involved in them they yield the
same premises and conclusions up to renaming of variables. These two
proposals proved to be extensionally equivalent only for limited fragments
of logic.
The normalization proposal stands behind very successful applications
of the typed lambda calculus and of category theory in the proof theory
of intuitionistic logic. In classical logic, however, it did not fare well.
The generality proposal was rather neglected in logic, though related
matters were much studied in pure category theory in connection with
coherence problems, and there are also links to low-dimensional topology
and linear algebra. This proposal seems more promising than the other
one for the general proof theory of classical logic.
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1 General proof theory
In mathematics, as in other established bodies of human knowledge, when a
question is not in the main stream of investigations, it runs the danger of being
given short shrift by the establishment. Often, when they are of a certain general
kind, such questions are dismissed as being “philosophical”, and often this need
not mean that the question is inherently such, that it cannot be approached in a
mathematical spirit, but it means only that the person dismissing the question
does not want to deal with it, presumably because he does not know how.
Before the advent of recursion theory, many mathematicians would presum-
ably have dismissed the question “What is a computable function?” as a philo-
sophical question, unworthy of attention, which only an outsider would deal
with. (I suppose that this question could even have been understood as a psy-
chological, empirical, question.) It required something like the enthusiasm of a
young discipline on the rise, which logic was in the first half of the twentieth
century, for such questions to be embraced as legitimate, and seriously treated
by mathematical means—with excellent results. In the meantime, logic has
aged, with losses in enthusiasm and gains in conformism.
An outsider might suppose that the question “What is a proof?” should
be important for a field called proof theory, and then he would be surprised
to find that this and related questions, one of which will occupy us here, are
exactly of the kind to be dismissed as “philosophical” by the establishment.
These questions are of the conceptual kind, and not of the technical kind, but
a great deal of mathematics—a great deal of the best mathematics—is of the
conceptual kind.
By the beginning of the 1970s, Prawitz, inspired by ideas of Kreisel, inaugu-
rated the field of general proof theory with this and related questions (see [44],
Section I.2; see also the next section of this survey). The field exists, I believe,
but its borders are not well marked, and the name Prawitz gave to it is not
widespread. (Some authors speak nowadays of structural proof theory, but I
am not sure this kind of proof theory, which seems to amount to basic proof
theory, is Prawitz’s general proof theory.) We need, however, a name for that
part of proof theory whose foundations are in Gentzen’s thesis [21], and which
differs from the proof theory whose subject grew out of consistency proofs for
formalized fragments of mathematics inaugurated also by Gentzen. This other
kind of proof theory, whose foundations are in Hilbert’s program and Go¨del’s
results, and which was dominant throughout the twentieth century, was called
reductive by Prawitz.
General proof theory, although it is seemingly more philosophical, is closer
to applications than reductive proof theory. It is in the period when logic
became increasingly intertwined with computer science, in the last decades of
the twentieth century, that general proof theory started gaining some ground.
Two matters mark this relative, still limited, success: one is the connection
with the typed lambda calculus, based on the Curry-Howard correspondence,
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and the other is the connection with category theory. A third area of proof
theory, distinct from general proof theory and reductive proof theory, emerged
at roughly the same period in association with complexity theory (see [46]).
Hilbert’s name is usually tied to reductive proof theory, but from the very
beginning of the century he was also interested in some questions of general
proof theory that touch upon complexity theory (see [52]).
2 The Normalization Conjecture
To keep up with the tradition, throughout the present survey we speak of
“proof”, though we could as well replace this term by the term “deduction”,
which might be more precise, since we have in mind deductive proofs from
assumptions (including the empty collection of assumptions).
The question “What is a proof?”, as the basic question of the field of general
proof theory, was introduced by Prawitz in [44] (Section I) with additional
specifications. Let us quote the relevant passage in extenso:
Obvious topics in general proof theory are:
2.1. The basic question of defining the notion of proof, including the
question of the distinction between different kinds of proofs such as
constructive proofs and classical proofs.
2.2. Investigation of the structure of (different kinds of) proofs,
including e.g. questions concerning the existence of certain normal
forms.
2.3. The representation of proofs by formal derivations. In the same
way as one asks when two formulas define the same set or two sen-
tences express the same proposition, one asks when two derivations
represent the same proof; in other words, one asks for identity crite-
ria for proofs or for a “synonymity” (or equivalence) relation between
derivations.
2.4. Applications of insights about the structure of proofs to other
logical questions that are not formulated in terms of the notion of
proof. (p. 237)
We are here especially interested in Prawitz’s topic 2.3, namely, in the ques-
tion of identity criteria for proofs. Prawitz’s merit is that he did not only
formulate this question very clearly, but also proposed a precise mathematical
answer to it.
Prawitz considered derivations in natural deduction systems and the equiva-
lence relation between derivations that is the reflexive, transitive and symmetric
closure of the immediate reducibility relation between derivations. Of course,
only derivations with the same assumptions and the same conclusion may be
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equivalent. Prawitz’s immediate reducibility relation is the one involved in re-
ducing a derivation to normal form. (As it is well known, the idea of this
reduction stems from Gentzen’s thesis [21].) A derivation reduces immediately
to another derivation (see [44], Section II.3.3) when the latter is obtained from
the former either by removing a maximum formula (i.e. a formula with a con-
nective α that is the conclusion of an introduction of α and the major premise
of an elimination of α), or by performing one of the permutative reductions tied
to the eliminations of disjunction and of the existential quantifier, which enables
us to remove what Prawitz calls maximum segments. There are some further
reductions, which Prawitz called immediate simplifications; they consist in re-
moving eliminations of disjunction where no hypothesis is discharged, and there
are similar immediate simplifications involving the existential quantifier, and
“redundant” applications of the classical absurdity rule. Prawitz also envisaged
reductions he called immediate expansions, which lead to the expanded normal
form where all the minimum formulae are atomic (minimum formulae are those
that are conclusions of eliminations and premises of introductions).
Prawitz formulates in [44] (Section II.3.5.6) the following conjecture, for
which he gives credit (in Section II.5.2) to Martin-Lo¨f, and acknowledges influ-
ence by ideas of Tait:
Conjecture. Two derivations represent the same proof if and only
if they are equivalent.
We will call this conjecture the Normalization Conjecture.
Prawitz considered the right-to-left direction of the Normalization Conjec-
ture as relatively unproblematic. He found it more difficult to unearth facts that
would support the other direction of the conjecture. At the same time (in the
same book where Prawitz’s paper [44] appeared), Kreisel considered how one
could justify by mathematical means a conjecture such as the Normalization
Conjecture, and in particular the left-to-right direction of the conjecture (see
[27], pp. 114-117, 165).
The Normalization Conjecture is an assertion of the same kind as Church’s
Thesis: we should not expect a formal proof of it. (Kreisel speaks in [27], p. 112,
of the “informal” character of the conjecture.) The Normalization Conjecture
attempts to give a formal reconstruction of an intuitive notion. (Like Church’s
Thesis, the Normalization Conjecture might be taken as a kind of definition. It
is, however, better to distinguish this particular kind of definition by a special
name. The Normalization Conjecture, as well as the Generality Conjecture,
which we will consider in the next section, might be taken as a case of analysis
in the sense of [5].)
Kreisel suggests (in [27], p. 116) that the right-to-left direction of the Nor-
malization Conjecture may be seen as analogous to a soundness assertion, while
the left-to-right direction is analogous to a completeness assertion. Derivations
are the syntactical matter, while intuitive proofs are their semantics. One could,
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however, take an exactly opposite view: proofs are the given syntactical matter,
which we model by derivations.
Martin-Lo¨f examined the Normalization Conjecture in [40] (Section 2.4, p.
104), giving credit to Prawitz for its formulation. He maintained that there is
little hope of establishing this conjecture unless “represent the same proof” on
the left-hand side is replaced by “are definitionally equal”, or identity of proofs
on the same side is replaced by provable identity; in both cases, the matter is
treated further within the realm of his intuitionistic theory of types of [39].
The Normalization Conjecture was formulated by Prawitz at the time when
the Curry-Howard correspondence between derivations in natural deduction and
typed lambda terms started being recognized more and more (though the epithet
“Curry-Howard” was not yet canonized). Prawitz’s equivalence relation between
derivations corresponds to beta-eta equality between typed lambda terms, if
immediate expansions are taken into account, and to beta equality otherwise.
When speaking of the Curry-Howard correspondence, one should, however,
bear in mind that it covers really well only the conjunction-implication frag-
ment of intuitionistic propositional logic. In the presence of disjunction, the
typed lambda calculus is extended with a ternary variable-binding operation
that serves to code disjunction elimination. Such lambda calculuses exist, but
they are not particularly appealing. Negation, i.e. the absurd constant propo-
sition, brings its own complications. (With variables of the type of the absurd
constant proposition one derives every equation.)
Nevertheless, the fact that we have an alternative formal representation of
proofs with typed lambda terms, and that equality between these terms agrees
so well with Prawitz’s equivalence of derivations, is quite remarkable. This
fact lends support to the Normalization Conjecture, as the fact that alterna-
tive formal representations of computable functions cover the same functions of
arithmetic lends support to Church’s Thesis.
Besides derivations in natural deduction and typed lambda terms, where
according to the Curry-Howard correspondence the latter can be conceived just
as codes for the former, there are other, more remote, formal representations of
proofs. There are first Gentzen’s sequent systems, which are related to natural
deduction, but are nevertheless different, and there are also representations of
proofs as arrows in categories. Equality of arrows with the same domain and
codomain, i.e. commuting diagrams of arrows, which is what category theory is
about, should now correspond to identity of proofs via a conjecture analogous
to the Normalization Conjecture.
The fact proved by Lambek (see [31] and [32], Part I; see also [7]) that the
category of typed lambda calculuses with functional types and finite product
types, based on beta-eta equality, is equivalent to the category of cartesian
closed categories, and that hence equality of typed lambda terms amounts to
equality between arrows in cartesian closed categories, lends additional support
to the Normalization Conjecture. Equality of arrows in bicartesian closed cat-
egories (i.e. cartesian closed categories with finite coproducts) corresponds to
5
equivalence of derivations in Prawitz’s sense in full intuitionistic propositional
logic.
In category theory, the Normalization Conjecture is tied to Lawvere’s Thesis
that all the logical constants of intuitionistic logic are characterized by adjoint
situations. Prawitz’s equivalence of derivations, in its beta-eta version, corre-
sponds to equality of arrows in various adjunctions tied to logical constants (see
[33], [6], Section 0.3.3, [8] and [7]). Adjunction is the unifying concept for the
reductions envisaged by Prawitz.
Even the fact that equality between lambda terms, as well as equality of
arrows in cartesian closed categories, were first conceived for reasons indepen-
dent of proofs is remarkable. This tells us that we are in the presence of a solid
mathematical structure, which may be illuminated from many sides, and is not
a figment.
Prawitz formulated the Normalization Conjecture having in mind mainly
intuitionistic logic. It was meant to cover classical logic too. One may, however,
formulate an analogous conjecture for all logics with a normalization procedure
analogous to Prawitz’s procedure for intuitionistic logic. Such are in particular
substructural logics. Such are also modal extensions of various logics. It is
not evident that Lawvere’s Thesis applies to all the logical constants of all
these logics; the adjunctions in question may be hidden, or perhaps there is no
adjunction, but only something related to it (for example, something like an
adjunction but lacking the unit or the counit natural transformation).
It may be asked whether the Normalization Conjecture, or another answer to
the question “When are two representations of proofs equal?”, brings us closer
to answering the basic question “What is a proof?”. If our answers to the first
question about identity criteria for proofs cut across various representations of
proofs, so that when one representation is translated into another they agree
about the notion of identity of proof, it seems that we could answer the basic
question “What is a proof?” by taking one of our representations and declaring
that the equivalence classes of this representation determine the notion we are
seeking. A proof is the equivalence class of one of its representations. This
does not settle, however, which representation we should choose. It presumably
cannot be any representation, but one that neither abolishes important distinc-
tions in the structure of the proof, nor introduces irrelevant features. Anyway,
it seems the Normalization Conjecture brings us closer to answering the basic
question.
The answer to the question “What is a computable function?”, which is
given by Church’s Thesis, did not involve such a factoring through an equiva-
lence relation, but the related question “What is an algorithm?” may require
exactly that. This last question was raised in recursion theory fairly recently by
Moschovakis in [41], where the fundamental interest of identity criteria for algo-
rithms is stressed (see Section 8 of that paper). It is rather natural to find that
the questions “What is a proof?” and “What is an algorithm?” are analogous.
As a matter of fact, many logicians conceive proofs just as a kind of algorithm
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for generating theorems. What should distinguish, however, this particular kind
of algorithm is the role logical constants play in it.
While Moschovakis approaches the question of identity criteria for algorithms
in a mathematical spirit, proof-theorists nowadays most often ignore the ques-
tion of identity criteria for proofs, or they dismiss it as “philosophical”, some-
times expressing doubt that a simple answer will ever be given to this question.
The answer Prawitz gave to this question with the Normalization Conjecture
is certainly not philosophical if “philosophical” means “vague” or “imprecise”.
Prawitz’s answer, which is rather simple, is maybe not conclusive, but it is a
mathematical answer. All the more so if we take into account its connection
with the lambda calculus and fundamental structures of category theory.
3 The Generality Conjecture
At the same time when Prawitz formulated the Normalization Conjecture, in a
series of papers ([28], [29], [30] and [31]) Lambek was engaged in a project where
arrows in various sorts of categories were construed as representing proofs. The
domain of an arrow corresponds to the collection of assumptions joined by a
conjunction connective, and the codomain corresponds to the conclusion. With
this series of papers Lambek inaugurated the field of categorial proof theory.
The categories Lambek considered in [28] and [29] are first those that corre-
spond to his substructural syntactic calculus of categorial grammar (these are
monoidal categories where the functors A⊗ . . . and . . .⊗A have right adjoints).
Next, he considered monads, which besides being fundamental for category the-
ory, cover proofs in modal logics of the S4 kind. In [30] and [31] Lambek
dealt with cartesian closed categories, which is Prawitz’s ground, since these
categories cover proofs in the conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic
logic. He also envisaged bicartesian closed categories, which cover the whole of
intuitionistic propositional logic.
Lambek’s insight is that equations between arrows in categories, i.e. commut-
ing diagrams of arrows, guarantee cut elimination, i.e. composition elimination,
in an appropriate language for naming arrows. (In [6] it is established that
for some basic notions of category theory, and in particular for the notion of
adjunction, the equations assumed are necessary and sufficient for cut elimi-
nation.) Since cut elimination is closely related to Prawitz’s normalization of
derivations, the equivalence relation envisaged by Lambek should be related to
Prawitz’s.
Actually, Lambek dealt with cut elimination in categories related to his syn-
tactic calculus and in monads. For cartesian closed categories he proved in
[31] another sort of result, which he called functional completeness. Lambek’s
functional completeness is analogous to the functional completeness (often called
combinatory completeness) of Scho¨nfinkel’s and Curry’s systems of combinators,
which enables us to define lambda abstraction in these systems. With the help
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of functional completeness, via the typed lambda calculus, Lambek established
that his equivalence relation between derivations in conjunctive-implicative in-
tuitionistic logic and Prawitz’s beta-eta equivalence amount to the same thing,
as we mentioned in the preceding section.
Lambek’s work is interesting for us here not only because he worked with
an equivalence relation between derivations amounting to Prawitz’s, but also
because he envisaged another kind of equivalence relation. Lambek’s idea is
best conveyed by considering the following example. In [30] (p. 65) he says
that the first projection arrow pi1p,p : p ∧ p → p and the second projection
arrow pi2p,p : p ∧ p → p, which correspond to two derivations of conjunction
elimination, have different generality, because they generalize to pi1p,q : p∧q → p
and pi2p,q : p ∧ q → q respectively, and these two arrows do not have the same
codomain; on the other hand, pi1p,q : p∧q → p and pi
2
q,p : q∧p→ p do not have the
same domain. The idea of generality may be explained roughly as follows. We
consider generalizations of derivations that diversify variables without changing
the rules of inference. Two derivations have the same generality when every
generalization of one of them leads to a generalization of the other, so that in
the two generalizations we have the same assumptions and conclusion (see [28],
p. 257). In the example above this is not the case.
Generality induces an equivalence relation between derivations. Two deriva-
tions are equivalent if and only if they have the same generality. Lambek does
not formulate so clearly as Prawitz a conjecture concerning identity criteria for
proofs, but he suggests that two derivations represent the same proof if and
only if they are equivalent in the new sense. We will call this conjecture the
Generality Conjecture.
The left-to-right direction of the Generality Conjecture seems pretty intu-
itive. The other direction is less clear, and if it happens to be true, that would
be something like a discovery. With the Normalization Conjecture, the situ-
ation was different: the right-to-left direction seemed unproblematic, and the
left-to-right direction was less clear.
Lambek’s own attempts at making the notion of generality precise (see [28],
p. 316, where the term “scope” is used instead of “generality”, and [29], pp. 89,
100) need not detain us here. In [30] (p. 65) he finds that these attempts were
faulty.
The simplest way to understand generality is to use graphs whose vertices
are occurrences of propositional letters in the assumptions and the conclusion
of a derivation. We connect by an edge occurrences of letters that must re-
main occurrences of the same letter after generalizing, and do not connect those
that may become occurrences of different letters. So for the first and second
projection above we would have the two graphs
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pi1p,p
p p
pi2p,p
p
p p
❅  
When the propositional letter p is replaced by an arbitrary formula A we have
an edge for each occurrence of propositional letter in A.
The generality of a derivation is such a graph. According to the Generality
Conjecture, the first and second projection derivations from p∧ p to p represent
different proofs because their generalities differ.
One defines an associative composition of such graphs, and there is also
an obvious identity graph with straight parallel edges, so that graphs make a
category, which we call the graphical category. If on the other hand it is taken
for granted that proofs also make a category, which we will call the syntactical
category, with composition of arrows being composition of proofs, and identity
arrows being identity proofs (an identity proof composed with any other proof,
either on the side of the assumptions or on the side of the conclusion, is equal
to this other proof), then the Generality Conjecture may be rephrased as the
assertion that there is a faithful functor from the syntactical category to the
graphical category.
If our syntactical category is precisely determined in advance, by relying on
the Normalization Conjecture, or perhaps in another way, then the Generality
Conjecture is something we can prove or disprove formally. If on the other hand
this syntactical category is left undetermined, then the Generality Conjecture
is in the same position as the Normalization Conjecture and Church’s Thesis,
and cannot be proved or disproved formally. We can only try to see how well it
accords with our other intuitions, and in particular with the intuition underlying
the Normalization Conjecture.
For example, it may be taken that the syntactical category in conjunctive
logic (without implication), both intuitionistic and classical (these two conjunc-
tive logics do not differ), is a cartesian category K freely generated by a set of
propositional letters (a category is cartesian when it has all finite products).
Conjunctive logic here includes the true constant proposition. That this syn-
tactical category may indeed be taken as the category of proofs in conjunctive
logic is in accordance with the Normalization Conjecture in its beta-eta version,
but it is not excluded that we have chosen this category for other reasons. The
graphical category G in this particular case may be taken to be the category
opposite to the category of functions on finite ordinals. The finite ordinals cor-
respond to the number of occurrences of propositional letters in a formula, and
functions go from the conclusions to the assumptions; that is why we have the
opposite of the category of functions. The Generality Conjecture is the assertion
that there is a faithful functor from K to G; that is, a functor G from K to G
such that for f and g with the same domain and the same codomain we have
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(∗) f = g in K if and only if G(f) = G(g) in G.
From left to right, the equivalence (∗) follows from the functoriality of G, and
from right to left, it expresses the faithfulness of G. In this particular case, the
Generality Conjecture understood as (∗) can be proved formally (see [42], [12]
and references therein concerning earlier statements and proofs of equivalent
results).
Note that graphs are not representations of proofs, as derivations in natural
deduction were. A graph may abolish many important distinctions; in partic-
ular, the images of different connectives, like conjunction and disjunction, may
be isomorphic in the graph. The Generality Conjecture answers the question of
identity criteria for proofs, and brings us closer to answering the basic question
“What is a proof?”, by involving representations of proofs more plausible than
graphs, like those we find in natural deduction, or in sequent systems, or in the
syntactical categories. A proof would be the equivalence class of such a plausi-
ble representation with respect to the equivalence relation defined in terms of
generality, i.e. in terms of graphs.
Understood in the sense of (∗), the Generality Conjecture is analogous to
what in category theory is called a coherence theorem. Coherence in category
theory was understood in various ways (we cannot survey here the literature on
this question; for earlier works see [38]), but the paradigmatic coherence results
of [37] and [26] can be understood as faithfulness results like (∗), and this is
how we will understand coherence. (The coherence questions one encounters in
the theory of weak n-categories, which we will mention at the end of the next
section, are of another, specific, kind.)
The coherence result of [26] proves the Generality Conjecture for the multi-
plicative conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic linear logic (modulo
a condition concerning the multiplicative true constant proposition, i.e. the unit
with respect to multiplicative conjunction), and, inspired by Lambek, it does
so via a cut-elimination proof. The syntactical category in this case is a free
symmetric monoidal closed category, and the graphical category is of a kind
studied in [18]. The graphs of this graphical category are closely related to
what in knot theory is called tangles. In tangles, as in braids, we distinguish
between two kinds of crossings, but here we need just one kind, in which it is not
distinguished which of the two crossed edges is above the other. (For categories
of tangles see [57], [54] and [24], Chapter 12.) Tangles with this single kind of
crossing are like graphs one encounters in Brauer algebras (see [1] and [55]).
Here is an example of such a tangle:
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✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✛✘✛✘
✚ ✙
(p ⊗ (q ⊗ (r → r)))⊗ (s → s)
((p → q) ⊗ p) ⊗ p
Tangles without crossings at all serve in [6] (Section 4.10; see also [9]) to
obtain a coherence result for the general notion of adjunction, which according
to Lawvere’s Thesis underlies all logical constants of intuitionistic logic, as we
mentioned in the preceding section. In terms of combinatorial low-dimensional
topology, the mathematical content of the general notion of adjunction is caught
by the Reidemeister moves of planar ambient isotopy. An analogous coherence
result for self-adjunctions, where a single endofunctor is adjoint to itself, is
proved in [15]. Through this latter result we reach the theory of Temperley-
Lieb algebras, which play a prominent role in knot theory and low-dimensional
topology, due to Jones’ representation of Artin’s braid groups in these algebras
(see [25], [36], [43] and references therein).
In [15] one finds also coherence results for self-adjunctions where the graph-
ical category is the category of matrices, i.e. the skeleton of the category of
finite-dimensional vector spaces over a fixed field with linear transformations as
arrows. Tangles without crossings may be faithfully represented in matrices by
a representation derived from the orthogonal group case of Brauer’s represen-
tation of Brauer algebras (see also [55], Section 3, and [23], Section 3). This
representation is based on the fact that the Kronecker product of matrices gives
rise to a self-adjoint functor in the category of matrices, and this self-adjointness
is related to the fact that in this category, as well as in the category of binary
relations between finite ordinals, finite products and coproducts are isomorphic.
In [42] there are interesting coherence results, which extend [37], for the
multiplicative conjunction fragments of substructural logics. Further coherence
results for intuitionistic and classical logic will be considered in the next section.
In the light of the connection with combinatorial aspects of low-dimensional
topology, which we mentioned above, the following quotation from [27] sounds
prophetical:
Remark. At the risk of trying to explain obscurum per obscurius,
I should point out a striking analogy between the problem of find-
ing (α) a conversion relation corresponding to identity of proofs and
(β) an “equivalence” relation such as that of combinatorial equiva-
lence in topology corresponding to a basic invariant in our geometric
concepts. (p. 117)
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(The sequel of Kreisel’s text suggests he had in mind equivalence relations that
cut across various representations of proofs, i.e. are insensitive to the peculiari-
ties of particular formalizations.)
From a logical point of view, the Generality Conjecture may be understood
as a completeness theorem. The left-to-right direction of the equivalence (∗) is
soundness, and the right-to-left direction is completeness proper. (This termi-
nology is opposite to that suggested by Kreisel for the Normalization Conjecture,
which we mentioned in the preceding section.)
Like the Normalization Conjecture, the Generality Conjecture gives a precise
mathematical answer to the question about identity criteria for proofs, and, like
the former conjecture, it has ties with important mathematical structures.
4 The two conjectures compared
The Normalization Conjecture and the Generality Conjecture agree only for
limited fragments of logic. As we said in the preceding section, they agree for
purely conjunctive logic (without implication), with or without the true constant
proposition ⊤. Conjunctive logic is the same for intuitionistic and classical logic.
Here the Normalization Conjecture is taken in its beta-eta version. By duality,
the two conjectures agree for purely disjunctive logic, with or without the ab-
surd constant proposition ⊥. If we have both conjunction and disjunction, but
do not yet have distribution of conjunction over disjunction, and have neither ⊤
nor ⊥, then the two conjectures still agree (see [14]). And here it seems we have
reached the limits of agreement as far as intuitionistic and classical logic are con-
cerned, provided the graphs involved in the Generality Conjecture correspond
to relations between the domain and the codomain. With more sophisticated
notions of graphs, matters may stand differently, and the area of agreement for
the two conjectures may perhaps be wider, but it can be even narrower, as we
will see below.
Coherence fails for the syntactical bicartesian categories, in which besides
nonempty finite products and coproducts we have also an empty product and
and an empty coproduct, i.e. a terminal object ⊤ and an initial object ⊥ (an
object in a category is terminal when there is exactly one arrow from any object
to it, and it is initial when there is exactly one arrow from it to any object). In
order to regain coherence we must pass to special bicartesian categories where
the first projection from the product of ⊥ with itself pi1
⊥,⊥ : ⊥ × ⊥ → ⊥ is
equal to the second projection pi2
⊥,⊥ : ⊥ × ⊥ → ⊥, and analogously for the
first and second injection from ⊤ to the coproduct of ⊤ with itself, namely
⊤+⊤ (see [13]). Here × corresponds to conjunction and + to disjunction. The
assumption concerning these two projections holds in the category Set, but the
assumption concerning the two injections does not. Both assumptions hold in
some other important bicartesian categories: the category of pointed sets, and
its subcategories of commutative monoids with monoid homomorphisms and of
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vector spaces over a fixed field with linear transformations. They hold also in
the category of matrices mentioned in the preceding section. Anyway, in the
presence of ⊤ and ⊥ the two conjectures do not agree, since normalization does
not deliver the assumption concerning the two injections.
The graphical category with respect to which we have coherence for syntac-
tical categories with nonempty finite products and coproducts is the category
of binary relations between finite ordinals (see [14]). In that category, × and +,
which correspond to conjunction and disjunction respectively, are isomorphic.
The intuitive idea of generality for conjunctive-disjunctive logic is not caught
by arbitrary binary relations, but by binary relations that are difunctional in the
sense of [47] (Section 7). A binary relation R is difunctional when RR−1R ⊆ R.
The composition of two difunctional relations is not necessarily difunctional, so
that we do not have at our disposal the category of difunctional relations, with
respect to which we could prove coherence, and, anyway, the image under the
faithful functor of an arrow from our syntactical category with nonempty finite
products and coproducts is not necessarily a difunctional relation.
Even if difunctionality were satisfied, it could still be questioned whether
our intuitive idea of generality is caught by binary relations in the case of
conjunctive-disjunctive logic. The problem is that if wp : p → p × p is a com-
ponent of the diagonal natural transformation, and ι1q,p : q → q + p is a first
injection, then in categories with finite products and coproducts we have
(1q + wp) ◦ ι
1
q,p = ι
1
q,p×p
where the left-hand side cannot be further generalized, but the right-hand side
can be generalized to ι1q,p×r . The intuitive idea of generality seems to require
that in wp : p→ p×p we should not have only a relation between the domain and
the codomain, as on the left-hand side below, but a graph as on the right-hand
side:
× ×p p p p
p p
✁
✁
✁
❆
❆
❆
✁
✁
✁
❆
❆
❆✞ ☎
(see [16], and also [17]). With such graphs we can still get coherence for con-
junctive logic, and for disjunctive logic, taken separately, but for conjunctive-
disjunctive logic the left-to-right direction, i.e. the soundness part, of coherence
would fail. So for conjunctive-disjunctive logic the idea of generality with which
we have coherence is not quite the intuitive idea suggested by Lambek, but only
something close to it, which involves the categorial notion of natural transfor-
mation.
The fragments of logic mentioned above where the Normalization Conjecture
and the Generality Conjecture agree all possess a property called maximality.
Let us say a few words about this very important property.
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For the whole field of general proof theory to make sense, and in particular for
considering the question of identity criteria for proofs, we should not have that
any two derivations with the same assumptions and conclusion are equivalent,
i.e. it should not be the case that there is never more than one proof with given
assumptions and a given conclusion. Otherwise, our field would be trivial.
This marks the watershed between proof theory and the rest of logic, where
one is not concerned with proofs, but at most with consequence relations. With
relations, we either have a pair made of a collection of assumptions and a conclu-
sion, or we do not have it. In proof theory, such pairs are indexed with various
proofs, and there may be several proofs for a single pair.
Now, categories with finite nonempty products, cartesian categories and cat-
egories with finite nonempty products and coproducts have the following prop-
erty. Take, for example, cartesian categories, and take any equation in the
language of free cartesian categories that does not hold in free cartesian cate-
gories. If a cartesian category K satisfies this equation, then K is a preorder;
namely, all arrows with the same domain and codomain are equal. We have
an exactly analogous property with the other sorts of categories we mentioned.
This property is a kind of Post completeness. Any extension of the equations
postulated leads to collapse.
Translated into logical language, this means that Prawitz’s equivalence re-
lation for derivations in conjunctive logic, disjunctive logic and conjunctive-
disjunctive logic without distribution and without ⊤ and ⊥, which in all these
cases agrees with our equivalence relation defined via generality in the style of
Lambek, is maximal. Any strengthening, any addition, would yield that any two
derivations with the same assumptions and the same conclusion are equivalent.
If the right-to-left direction of the Normalization Conjecture holds, with
maximality we can efficiently justify the left-to-right direction, which Prawitz
found problematic in [44], and about which Kreisel was thinking in [27]. In the
footnote on p. 165 of that paper Kreisel mentions that Barendregt suggested
this justification via maximality. Suppose the right-to-left direction of the Nor-
malization Conjecture holds, suppose that for some assumptions and conclusion
there is more than one proof, and suppose the equivalence relation is maximal.
Then if two derivations represent the same proof, they are equivalent. Because
if they were not equivalent, we would never have more than one proof with given
assumptions and a given conclusion. Nothing can be missing from our equiv-
alence relation, because whatever is missing, by maximality, leads to collapse
on the side of the equivalence relation, and, by the right-to-left direction of the
conjecture, it also leads to collapse on the side of identity of proofs.
Prawitz in [44] found it difficult to justify the left-to-right direction of the
Normalization Conjecture, and Kreisel was looking for mathematical means that
would provide this justification. Maximality is one such means.
Establishing the left-to-right direction of the Normalization Conjecture via
maximality is like proving the completeness of the classical propositional calcu-
lus with respect to any kind of nontrivial model via Post completeness (which
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is proved syntactically by reduction to conjunctive normal form). Actually, the
first proof of this completeness with respect to tautologies was given by Bernays
and Hilbert exactly in this manner (see [58]).
Maximality for the sort of categories considered above is proved with the
help of coherence in [12] and [14] (which is established proof-theoretically, by
normalization, cut elimination and similar methods). Maximality is proved for
cartesian closed categories via a typed version of Bo¨hm’s theorem in [50], [48]
and [11]. This justifies the left-to-right direction of the Normalization Conjec-
ture also for the implicational and the conjunction-implication fragments of in-
tuitionistic logic. The maximality of bicartesian closed categories, which would
justify the left-to-right direction of the Normalization Conjecture for the whole
of intuitionistic propositional logic is, as far as I know, an open problem. (A
use for maximality similar to that propounded here and in [11] and [12] was
envisaged in [56], it seems independently.)
In [6] (Section 4.11) it is proved that the general notion of adjunction is
also maximal in some sense. The maximality we encountered above, which
involves connectives tied to particular adjunctions, cannot be derived from the
maximality of the general notion of adjunction, but these matters should not
be foreign to each other.
The Normalization Conjecture and the Generality Conjecture do not agree
for the conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic logic. We do not have
coherence for cartesian closed categories if the graphs in the graphical cate-
gory are taken to be of the tangle type Kelly and Mac Lane had for symmetric
monoidal closed categories combined with the graphs we had for cartesian cat-
egories (see the preceding section). Both the soundness part and the complete-
ness part of coherence fail for cartesian closed categories. The soundness part
of coherence also fails for distributive bicartesian categories, and a fortiori for
bicartesian closed categories. The problem is that in these categories distribu-
tion of conjunction over disjunction is taken to be an isomorphism, and graphs
do not deliver that (see [14], Section 1).
The problem with the soundness part of coherence for cartesian closed cate-
gories may be illustrated with typed lambda terms in the following manner. By
beta conversion and alpha conversion, we have the following equation:
λx〈x, x〉λyy = 〈λyy, λzz〉
for y and z of type p, and x of type pp (which corresponds to p implies p). The
closed terms on the two sides of this equation are both of type pp×pp. The type
of the term on the left-hand side cannot be further generalized, but the type
of the term 〈λyy, λzz〉, can be generalized to p
p × qq. The problem noted here
does not depend essentially on the presence of surjective pairing 〈. . . , . . .〉 and of
product types; it arises also with purely functional types. This problem depends
essentially on the multiple binding of variables, which we have in λx〈x, x〉; that
is, it depends on the structural rule of contraction.
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This throws some doubt on the right-to-left direction of the Normalization
conjecture, which Prawitz, and Kreisel too, found relatively unproblematic. It
might be considered strange that two derivations represent the same proof if,
without changing inference rules, one can be generalized in a manner in which
the other cannot be generalized.
In [19] (p. 234) Feferman expresses doubt about the right-to-left direction
of the Normalization Conjecture because he finds that a proof pi of A(t) ending
with the elimination of the universal quantifier from the premise ∀xA(x) is
different from the proof pi′ of A(t) obtained from pi by removing ∀xA(x) as a
maximum formula. The proof pi contains more information than pi′. In [45]
Prawitz replied that he takes a proof not “as a collection of sentences but as the
result of applying certain operations to obtain a certain end result” (p. 249).
It seems Feferman’s objection is at the level of provability, and not at the level
of proofs. A related objection due to Kreisel, and some other objections to the
Normalization Conjecture, may be found in [53] (Section 5.3).
The Normalization Conjecture has, for the time being, the following advan-
tage over the Generality Conjecture. It applies also to predicate logic, whereas
the latter conjecture has not yet been investigated outside propositional logic.
When we compare the two conjectures we should also say something about
their computational aspects. With the Normalization Conjecture, we have to
rely on reduction to a unique normal form in the typed lambda calculus in order
to check equivalence of derivations in the conjunction-implication fragment of
intuitionistic propositional logic. Nothing more practical than that is known,
and such syntactical methods may be tiresome. Outside of the conjunction-
implication fragment, in the presence of disjunction and negation, such methods
become uncertain.
Methods for checking equivalence of derivations in accordance with the Gen-
erality Conjecture, i.e. methods suggested by coherence results, often have a
clear advantage. This is like the advantage truth tables have over syntactical
methods of reduction to normal form in order to check tautologicality. However,
the semantical methods delivered by coherence results have this advantage only
if the graphical category is simple enough. And when we enter into categories
suggested by knot theory, this simplicity may be lost. Then, on the contrary,
syntax may help us to decide equality in the graphical category.
The Normalization Conjecture has made a foray in theoretical computer
science, in the area of typed programming languages. It is not clear whether
one could expect the Generality Conjecture to play a similar role.
The reflexive and transitive closure of Prawitz’s immediate reducibility re-
lation, i.e. Prawitz’s reducibility relation, may be deemed more important than
his equivalence relation, which we have considered up to now. This matter leads
outside the topic of our survey, which is about identity of proofs, but it is worth
mentioning. We may “categorify” the identity relation between proofs, and con-
sider not only other relations between proofs, like Prawitz’s reducibility relation,
but maps between proofs. The proper framework for doing that seems to be the
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framework of weak 2-categories, where we have 2-arrows between arrows; or we
could even go to n-categories, where we have n+1-arrows between n-arrows (one
usually speaks of cells in this context). Composition of 1-arrows is associative
only up to a 2-arrow isomorphism, and analogously for other equations between
1-arrows. Identity of 1-arrows is replaced by 2-arrows satisfying certain condi-
tions, which are called coherence conditions. This notion of coherence is related
to the coherence we have considered above, but it is specific, and need not be
the same. Reducibility between arrows, however, does not necessarily give rise
to an isomorphism.
In the context of the Generality Conjecture, we may also find it natural to
consider 2-arrows instead of identity. The orientation would here be given by
passing from a graph with various “detours” to a graph that is more “straight”,
which need not be taken any more as equal to the original graph.
With all this we would enter into a very lively field of category theory,
interacting with other disciplines, mainly topology (see [34], [35] and papers
cited therein). The field looks very promising for general proof theory, both
from Prawitz’s and from Lambek’s point of view, but, as far as I know, it has
not yet yielded to proof theory much more than promises.
5 The Normalization Conjecture in classical logic
The Normalization Conjecture fares rather well in intuitionistic logic, but not
so well in classical logic. The main difficulty in classical logic is tied to the fact
that in every bicartesian closed category, for every object A there is at most
one arrow with domain A and the initial object ⊥ as codomain. Assuming the
Normalization Conjecture, this would mean that in intuitionistic propositional
logic for every formula A there is at most one proof with assumption A and the
absurd constant proposition ⊥ as conclusion, i.e. there cannot be more than one
way to reduce A to the absurd.
In [32] the discovery of that fact is credited to Joyal (p. 116), and the fact is
established (on p. 67, Proposition 8.3) by relying on a proposition of Freyd (see
[20], p. 7, Proposition 1.12) to the effect that if in a cartesian closed category
Hom(A,⊥) is not empty, then A ∼= ⊥; that is, A is isomorphic to ⊥. Here is a
simpler proof of the same fact.
Proposition 1. In every cartesian closed category with an initial object ⊥ we
have that Hom(A,⊥) is either empty or a singleton.
Proof. In every cartesian closed category with ⊥ we have pi1
⊥,⊥ = pi
2
⊥,⊥ : ⊥×⊥ →
⊥, because Hom(⊥×⊥,⊥) ∼= Hom(⊥,⊥⊥). Then for f, g : A → ⊥ we have
pi1
⊥,⊥ ◦ 〈f, g〉 = pi
2
⊥,⊥ ◦ 〈f, g〉, and so f = g. q.e.d.
In [32] (p. 67) it is concluded from Proposition 1 that if in a bicartesian
closed category for every object A we have A ∼= ¬¬A, where the “negation” ¬B
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is ⊥B (which corresponds to B implies ⊥), then this category is a preorder. If
classical logic requires A ∼= ¬¬A for every proposition A, then the proof theory
of that logic is trivial: there is at most one proof with given assumptions and a
given conclusion.
If the requirement A ∼= ¬¬A is deemed too strong, here is another proposi-
tion, which infers triviality from another natural requirement.
Proposition 2. Every cartesian closed category with an initial object ⊥ in
which we have a natural transformation whose components are ζA : ¬¬A → A
is a preorder.
Proof. Take f, g : ¬¬A → B, and take the canonical arrow ε′A : A → ¬¬A,
which we have by the cartesian closed structure of our category. Then we have
¬¬(f ◦ ε′A) = ¬¬(g ◦ ε
′
A) by Proposition 1, and from
ζB ◦ ¬¬(f ◦ ε
′
A) = ζB ◦ ¬¬(g ◦ ε
′
A),
by the naturality of ζ, we infer
f ◦ ε′A ◦ ζA = g ◦ ε
′
A ◦ ζA.
Since ε′A ◦ ζA = 1¬¬A by Proposition 1, we have f = g.
Then, for ⊤ terminal, we have
Hom(C,D) ∼= Hom(⊤, DC)
∼= Hom(¬¬⊤, DC),
since ⊤ ∼= ¬¬⊤, and Hom(¬¬⊤, DC) is at most a singleton, as we have shown
above. q.e.d.
Here is another proposition similar to Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Every bicartesian closed category in which we have a dinatural
transformation whose components are ξA : ⊤ → A+ ¬A is a preorder.
Proof. Take f, g : ⊤ → A. Then ¬f = ¬g by Proposition 1, and from
(1A + ¬f) ◦ ξA = (1A + ¬g) ◦ ξA,
by the dinaturality of ξ, we infer
(f + ¬1⊤) ◦ ξ⊤ = (g + ¬1⊤) ◦ ξ⊤.
Since ξ⊤ is an isomorphism, we obtain f + ¬1⊤ = g + ¬1⊤, from which f = g
follows with the help of first injections. q.e.d.
The naturality of ζ in Proposition 2 is a requirement with proof-theoretical
justification: it has to do with permuting cuts with rules for negation. Some-
thing similar applies to ξ.
18
So, with the Normalization Conjecture, the case for the general proof theory
of classical logic looks pretty bleak. A number of natural requirements lead to
collapse and triviality.
All these considerations involve an initial object ⊥. In the absence of the ini-
tiality of ⊥, matters stand better. Besides that, classical logic can be embedded
by a double-negation translation not only in Heyting’s intuitionistic logic, but
also in Kolmogorov’s minimal intuitionistic logic, which is essentially Heyting’s
negationless logic. Relying on this translation, we could still obtain a nontrivial
proof theory for classical logic in the presence of the Normalization Conjecture.
The initiality of ⊥, that is the requirement that there is just one proof with
given conclusion and with ⊥ as assumption, may perhaps be questioned. If ⊥
is not devoid of structure, why could not we proceed in different ways to infer
something from it? For example, if ⊥ is taken to be p∧¬p, we can infer p from
it either by the first projection, or by passing to p∧ (¬p∨ p) and then applying
the disjunctive syllogism that enables us to infer B form A ∧ (¬A ∨ B). Why
must we take these proofs as identical? (We have here two derivations with
different generality in Lambek’s sense: the first generalizes to a derivation of p
from p ∧ ¬q and the second to a derivation of q from p ∧ ¬p; so, according to
the Generality Conjecture, we have two different proofs.)
Still, rejecting the initiality of ⊥ looks like a desperate measure, not in tune
with the other intuitions underlying the Normalization Conjecture. And if we
choose to embed classical logic in intuitionistic logic, classical logic would not
be on its own, but would be taken only as a fragment of intuitionistic logic.
The problems we find with the Normalization Conjecture in classical logic
might accord with the conception that intuitionistic logic is truly the logic of
provability, whereas classical logic is the logic of something else: it is the logic
of truth (and falsehood), and we should not be surprised to find that its general
proof theory is trivial. If, however, we rely on the Generality Conjecture, matters
may look different, as we will see in the next section.
6 The Generality Conjecture in classical logic
The Generality Conjecture seems more promising for classical logic than the
Normalization Conjecture. Anyway, it does not lead to collapse and triviality.
The matter has not yet been fully explored, since apart from fragmentary coher-
ence results, mentioned in Section 4 above, where the two conjectures agree, and
apart from coherence results in substructural logics, the Generality Conjecture
was rather neglected in logic.
The Generality Conjecture underlies the method of proof nets for multiplica-
tive classical linear logic. The insight provided by [4] is that proof nets are based
on a coherence result for ∗-autonomous categories, which in its turn is based
on a coherence result for categories with the linear distribution A ∧ (B ∨ C)→
(A ∧ B) ∨ C (previously called weak distribution). Linear distribution is what
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we need for multiple-conclusion cut.
The distribution arrow of type A∧(B∨C)→ (A∧B)∨(A∧C) defined in terms
of linear distribution with the help of the diagonal arrow of type A→ A ∧ A is
not an isomorphism. This is an important difference with respect to bicartesian
closed categories, where distribution is an isomorphism.
Graphs related to our graphs were tied to sequent derivations of classical
logic in [2] and [3], but apparently without the intention to discuss the question
of identity criteria for proofs.
The price we have to pay for accepting the Generality Conjecture in classical
logic is that not all connectives will be tied to adjoint functors, as required by
Lawvere’s Thesis. For example, conjunction and disjunction will be tied to such
functors in the conjunctive-disjunctive fragment of classical logic, but when we
add implication or negation, in the whole of classical propositional logic, these
adjunctions will be lost. The diagonal arrows of type A→ A ∧ A, for instance,
will not make a natural transformation (this has to do with the failure of the
equation involving 〈x, x〉, which we considered in Section 4).
But there might be gains in accepting the Generality Conjecture in classical
logic, and we shall point briefly in the next section towards a prospect that looks
interesting.
7 Addition of proofs and zero proofs
Gentzen’s multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic has a rule of
addition of derivations, which is derived as follows:
contractions
f : A→ B
θRC(f) : A→ B,C
g : A→ B
θLC(g) : C,A→ B
cut(θRC(f), θ
L
C(g)) : A,A→ B,B
f + g : A→ B
Here θRC(f) and θ
L
C(g) are obtained from f and g respectively by thinning on
the right and thinning on the left, and cut(θRC(f), θ
L
C(g)) may be conceived as
obtained by applying to f and g a limit case of Gentzen’s multiple-cut rule mix,
where the collection of mix formulae is empty. (A related rule was considered
under the name mix in linear logic.)
In a cut-elimination procedure like Gentzen’s, f + g is reduced either to f or
to g (see [21], Sections III.3.113.1-2). If we have f + g = f and f + g = g, then
we get immediately f = g, that is collapse and triviality (cf. Appendix B.1 by
Lafont of [22]). If we keep only one of these equations and reject the other, then
to evade collapse we must reject the commutativity of +, but it seems all these
decisions would be arbitrary. (For similar reasons, even without assuming the
commutativity of +, the assumptions of [51], p. 232, C.12, lead to preorder.)
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The Generality Conjecture tells us that we should have neither f + g = f
nor f + g = g. The addition of two graphs may well produce a graph differing
from each of the graphs added. It also tells us that addition of proofs should be
associative and commutative.
If we have addition of proofs, it is natural to assume that we also have for
every formula A and every formula B a zero proof 0A,B : A→ B, with an empty
graph, which with addition of proofs makes the structure of a commutative
monoid. We may envisage having zero proofs 0A,B : A → B only for those A
and B where there is also a nonzero proof from A to B, but here we consider
the more sweeping assumption involving every A and every B.
We should immediately face the complaint that with such zero proofs we
have entered into inconsistency, since everything is provable. That is true,
but not all proofs have been made identical, and we are here not interested in
what is provable, but in what proofs are identical. If it happens—and with the
Generality Conjecture it will happen indeed—that introducing zero proofs is
conservative with respect to identity of proofs which do not involve zero proofs,
then it is legitimate to introduce zero proofs. Provided it is useful for some
purpose. This is like extending our mathematical theories with what Hilbert
called “ideal” objects; like extending the positive integers with zero, or like
extending the reals with imaginary numbers.
What useful purpose might be served by introducing zero proofs? With
addition of proofs, our graphical category in the case of conjunctive-disjunctive
logic turns up to be a category of matrices, rather than the category of binary
relations (see Sections 3 and 4 above), although the category of binary relations
makes sense too, provided we accept that addition of proofs is idempotent (i.e.
f+f = f , which means + is union rather than addition of proofs). Composition
becomes matrix multiplication, and addition is matrix addition. And in the
presence of zero matrices, we obtain a unique normal form like in linear algebra:
every matrix is the sum of matrices with a single 1 entry.
A number of logicians have sought a link between logic and linear algebra,
and here is such a link. We have it not for an alternative logic, but for classical
logic. We have it, however, not at the level of provability, but at the level of
identity of proofs.
The unique normal form suggested by linear algebra is not unrelated to
cut elimination. In the graphical category of matrices, cut elimination is just
matrix multiplication. And the equations of this category yield a cut-elimination
procedure. They yield it even in the absence of zero proofs (provided f+f = f),
and unlike cut-elimination procedures for classical logic in the style of Gentzen,
the new procedure admits a commutative addition of proofs without collapse.
So, in classical logic, the Generality Conjecture is not foreign to cut elimination,
and it would not be foreign to the Normalization Conjecture if we understand
the equivalence relation involved in this conjecture in a manner different from
Prawitz’s.
This need not exhaust the advantages of having zero proofs. They may be
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used also to analyze disjunction elimination. Without pursuing this topic very
far, let us note that passing from A ∨ B to A involves a zero proof from B to
A, and passing from A ∨B to B involves a zero proof from A to B. If next we
are able to reach C both from A and from B, we may add our two proofs from
A ∨B to C, and so to speak “cancel” the two zero proofs.
On an intuitive level, we should not imagine that zero proofs are faulty
proofs. They are rather hypothetical proofs, postponed proofs, or something
like the oracles of recursion theory.
8 Propositional identity
Once we have answered the question of identity criteria for proofs, by the Nor-
malization Conjecture, the Generality Conjecture, or in another satisfactory
manner, armed with our answer we may try approaching other logical ques-
tions, as envisaged by Prawitz in his topic 2.4 of general proof theory (see the
beginning of Section 2 above). Here we will sketch how we can apply this answer
to settle the question of propositional identity (which was mentioned by Prawitz
in topic 2.3).
Categorial proof theory suggests concepts that were not previously envisaged
in logic. Such a concept is isomorphism between sentences, which is understood
as in category theory. (A certain school of category theory recommends that we
should drop identity and think always in terms of isomorphism.) A sentence A
is isomorphic to a sentence B if and only if there is a proof f from A to B and a
proof f−1 from B to A such that f composed with f−1 is equal to the identity
proof from A to A and f−1 composed with f is equal to the identity proof from
B to B. An identity proof is such that when composed with any other proof,
either on the side of the assumptions or on the side of the conclusion, it is equal
to this other proof. That two sentences are isomorphic means that they behave
exactly in the same manner in proofs: by composing, we can always extend
proofs involving one of them, either as assumption or as conclusion, to proofs
involving the other, so that nothing is lost, nor gained. There is always a way
back. By composing further with the inverses, we return to the original proofs.
Isomorphism between sentences is an equivalence relation stronger than mu-
tual implication. So, for example, A ∧ B is isomorphic to B ∧ A, while A ∧ A
only implies and is implied by A, but is not isomorphic to it. (The problem is
that the composition of the proof from A ∧ A to A, which is either the first or
the second projection, with the diagonal proof from A to A ∧ A is not equal to
the identity proof from A ∧ A to A ∧A.)
It seems reasonable to suppose that isomorphism between sentences analyzes
propositional identity, i.e. identity of meaning for sentences:
Two sentences express the same proposition if and only if they are
isomorphic.
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This way we would base propositional identity upon identity of proofs, since in
defining isomorphism of sentences we relied essentially on a notion of identity
of proofs.
By relying on either the Normalization Conjecture or the Generality Con-
jecture, the formulae isomorphic in conjunctive logic are characterized by the
equations of commutative monoids. (By duality, this solves the problem also
for disjunctive logic.) By relying on the Normalization Conjecture, the formulae
isomorphic in the conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic logic, i.e.
objects isomorphic in all cartesian closed categories, have been characterized
in [49] via the axiomatization of equations with multiplication, exponentiation
and one, true for natural numbers. This fragment of arithmetic (upon which
one comes in connection with Tarski’s “high-school algebra problem”) is finitely
axiomatizable and decidable. (For an analogous result about the multiplica-
tive conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic linear logic see [10].) The
problem of characterizing isomorphic formulae in the whole intuitionistic propo-
sitional calculus, which corresponds to bicartesian closed categories, seems to
be still open.
Leibniz’s analysis of identity, given by the equivalence
Two individual terms name the same object if and only if in every
sentence one can be replaced by the other without change of truth
value,
assumes as given and uncontroversial propositional equivalence, i.e. identity of
truth value for sentences, and analyzes in terms of it identity of individuals.
We analyzed above propositional identity in terms of isomorphism between sen-
tences, a notion that presupposes an understanding of identity of proofs, and
our analysis resembles Leibniz’s to a certain extent.
Propositional equivalence, which in classical logic is defined by identity of
truth value, amounts to mutual implication, and is understood as follows in a
proof-theoretical context:
A is equivalent to B if and only if there is a proof from A to B and
a proof from B to A.
This relation between the propositions A and B, which certainly cannot amount
to the stricter relation of propositional identity, does not presuppose under-
standing identity of proofs. We analyzed propositional identity by imposing on
the composition of the two proofs from A to B and from B to A a condition
formulated in terms of identity of proofs.
The question of propositional identity seems as philosophical as the question
of identity of proofs, if not more so, but the answer we proposed to this question
is rather mathematical, as were the answers given to the question of identity of
proofs by the Normalization and Generality Conjectures.
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9 Conclusion
The question we have discussed here suggests a perspective in logic—or perhaps
we may say a dimension—that has not been explored enough. Logicians were,
and still are, interested mostly in provability, and not in proofs. This is so even
in proof theory. When we address the question of identity of proofs we have
certainly left the realm of provability, and entered into the realm of proofs. This
should become clear in particular when we introduce the zero proofs of Section
7.
The complaint might be voiced that with the Normalization and Generality
Conjectures we are giving very limited answers to the question of identity of
proofs. What about identity of proofs in the rest of mathematics, outside logic?
Shouldn’t we take into account many other inference rules, and not only those
based on logical constants? Perhaps not if the structure of proofs is taken to
be purely logical. Perhaps conjectures like the Normalization and Generality
Conjectures are not far from the end of the road.
Faced with two concrete proofs in mathematics—for example, two proofs of
the Theorem of Pythagoras, or something more involved—it could seem pretty
hopeless to try to decide whether they are identical just armed with the Normal-
ization Conjecture or the Generality Conjecture. But this hopelessness might
just be the hopelessness of formalization. We are overwhelmed not by compli-
cated principles, but by sheer quantity.
An answer to the question of identity criteria for proofs could perhaps also be
expected to come from the area of proof theory tied to complexity theory, which
we mentioned at the end of the first section. There is perhaps an equivalence
relation between derivations defined somehow in terms of complexity by means
of which we could formulate a conjecture analogous to the Normalization and
Generality Conjectures, but I am not aware that a conjecture of that kind has
been proposed.
Although the problem of identity criteria for proofs is a conceptual mathe-
matical problem, one might get interested in it for technical reasons too. There
is interesting mathematics behind this problem. But one should probably also
have an interest in logic specifically. Now, it happens that many logicians are
not interested in logic. They are more concerned by other things in mathemat-
ics. They dwell somehow within the realm of what is accepted as logic, but
they deal with other mathematical matters. Logic is taken for granted. Some
logicians, however, hope for discoveries in logic.
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